CoP Paper 2/2007

For discussion on 8 January 2007

Commission on Poverty (CoP)

"From Welfare to Self-reliance" - Disregarded Earnings

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to seek Members' view on the review of the provision of disregarded earnings (DE) and the initial thinkings on how to promote "Welfare to Self-reliance" under the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme.

ADVICE SOUGHT

2. On DE, Members are requested to advise on the recommendations as follow :

- (a) raise the 'no-deduction' limit of monthly DE from \$600 to \$800;
- (b) relax the rule to allow CSSA cases to be eligible for DE from not less than three months to not less than two months;
- (c) maintain the maximum level of DE; and
- (d) maintain no time limit on DE.

3. On "Welfare to Self-reliance", Members may wish to note the preliminary views of Social Welfare Advisory Committee (SWAC) after its visits to Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada in 2006. Any comments from Members are welcome.

BACKGROUND

4. At the CoP meeting held on 13 June, it was agreed that :

- (a) Health, Welfare and Food Bureau (HWFB) would conduct a more detailed examination of the existing DE arrangements in consultation with SWAC; and
- (b) HWFB/SWAC need to study the broad policy direction and interface issues to provide support to those employable able-bodied CSSA recipients to rejoin the labour market.

(A) <u>REVIEW OF DE</u>

Purpose of DE

5. DE refers to the earnings from employment that are disregarded when assessing the amount of CSSA payable. The provision of DE aims to allow CSSA recipients who work to be financially better off than those relying entirely on welfare, thus encouraging those who can work to find and remain in employment.

Changes to the DE arrangements in 2003

6. In June 2003, we raised the maximum level of monthly DE from \$1,805 to \$2,500 and its "no-deduction limit" from \$451 to \$600, while at the same time introducing the rule of allowing no DE for CSSA recipients in cases which have been on CSSA for less than three months. These changes were implemented on a time-limited basis for three years subject to review. We have completed the review and briefed SWAC on the findings.

Current Arrangements

- 7. The current arrangements of DE are as follows:
 - (a) At present, the monthly earnings of CSSA recipients can be partially disregarded up to a maximum of \$2,500. The first \$600 of the monthly earnings (the "no-deduction" limit) and 50% of the remaining monthly earnings are disregarded up to a maximum of \$2,500 :

Earnings	Level of disregard	Maximum amount to	
		be disregarded	
First \$600	100%	\$600	
Next \$3,800	50%	\$1,900	
\$4,400 or above	The first \$600 and	\$2,5 00	
	half of next \$3,800		

- (b) All categories of CSSA cases that have been in the net for not less than three months can benefit from the provision of DE.
- (c) The first month's income from a new job can be totally disregarded on condition that the recipient has not benefited from this provision during the past two years. This provides an added incentive for unemployed CSSA recipients to find work.

Relevant Considerations

8. The provision of DE under the CSSA Scheme is a very complex issue. On the one hand, there appears a case for providing CSSA recipients with more financial incentives through the provision of DE to find and remain in employment. On the other hand, more generous DE may render more people eligible for CSSA and delay their exit from the system.

9. The total amount of earnings of CSSA recipients that is disregarded has risen significantly over the recent past, because of various improvements on DE and the growing number of CSSA cases involving able-bodied adults. It soared from \$298.9 million (equivalent to 2.1% of total CSSA expenditure) in 2001-02 to \$830.7 million (equivalent to 4.7% of total CSSA expenditure) in 2005-06, up \$531.8 million or 178%. Over the same period, by comparison, total expenditure on CSSA went up by 23.3%.

Recommendations

10. We have examined some possible options and recommend to improve the provision of DE as follows.

(a) <u>Raise the "no-deduction" limit from \$600 to \$800</u>

11. The current "no-deduction" limit was last raised in June 2003 by 33% from \$451 to \$600. There has been a suggestion that the "no-deduction" limit should be adjusted upwards to allow those earning a relatively small income from part-time or casual work to retain more of their income. We have examined the options of raising the "no-deduction" limit of monthly DE to various levels at \$700, \$800 or \$900 and recommend a moderate increase from \$600 to \$800. (The financial implication would be \$23 million per annum, benefiting approximately 19 600 recipients.) Our considerations are :

- (i) With the implementation of the New Dawn Project¹ since April 2006, it is expected that more single parents and child carers will find part-time jobs. In recognition of the costs of meals taken at work and other employment-related expenses, for example, clothing and transport costs, a moderate increase of \$200 in the "no-deduction" limit should provide more incentives for CSSA recipients to take up part-time or casual employment if this is all that is available. Part-time and occasional jobs do help welfare recipients maintain contact with the labour market, thus providing them with more opportunities to improve their employability and find a full-time job. It is hoped that through developing a working habit, CSSA recipients will ultimately be self-reliant and leave the CSSA net.
- (ii) We have looked into the possibility of raising the no-deduction limit to \$700 but an increase of \$100 might not be significant to make any impact. On the other hand, if we raise the limit to \$900, which represents a 50% increase in the DE, it might encourage more people to enter the CSSA net, thus increasing the caseload and welfare costs. There is also the danger that some people may choose to remain on CSSA and not to make any real effort to find more remunerative or full time employment.

¹ Under the New Dawn Project, CSSA single parents and child carers with the youngest child aged 12 to 14 are required to seek part- time employment (defined as a paid job entailing not less than 32 hours a month).

(b) <u>Relax the "no DE for the first three months" rule to a two-month rule</u>

12. In the 2003 changes to the DE arrangements, we introduced the rule of allowing no DE for recipients in cases which have been on CSSA for less than three months (the "no DE for the first three months" rule) to prevent those considered to have sufficient means to meet their basic needs from gaining entry into the welfare system. Some groups have criticized the "no DE for the first three months" rule as a disincentive for newly admitted able-bodied CSSA recipients to seek employment in the first three months and call for abolition of this rule. We have examined the desirability of abolishing the rule or relaxing the requirement. We recommend relaxing the rule to a "two-month" rule on the following considerations :

- (i) Abolishing the rule altogether may allow those who are in employment and at income level not eligible for assistance under the current arrangement to become eligible as a result of removing the "three-month" rule. For example, for a 4-person family that is eligible for a monthly payment of \$9,200, if the family has a monthly income of \$9,200, under the current arrangement of no DE deduction for the first three months, this family is not eligible to receive CSSA payment. If the "three-month" rule is removed altogether, due to eligibility for DE deduction, this family becomes eligible for CSSA payment of \$2,500 on top of the family income of \$9,200, thus giving the family a total of \$11,700 per month. It is not possible to make a guess at the number of households that would enter the welfare rolls and the additional expenditure.
- (ii) On the other hand, based on the findings of the review of the DE arrangements, there is no evidence of the 'no DE for the first three months' rule act as a strong disincentive to work for newly admitted unemployed recipients.
- (iii) Relaxing the "three-month" rule to "two-month" may encourage existing CSSA recipients to seek employment earlier and it would still have the effect of discouraging those outside the CSSA net to gain entry to the welfare system.

(iv) We have also examined the option of further relaxing the rule to a "one-month" rule but consider that it may not be sufficient to deter those who have sufficient means to meet their basic needs from entering the CSSA net by temporarily suspending their employment.

(c) Maintain the maximum level of DE

13. The existing maximum level of DE was increased from \$1,805 to \$2,500 in June 2003. Now and then there are calls from concern groups to increase the maximum level of monthly DE. We consider that there is no case for further raising the maximum level of monthly DE. The arguments are as follows :

- (i) The basic assumption of DE is that if CSSA recipients are allowed to keep more of their earnings, they would have more incentives to work, and that if more recipients take up employment, the government would spend less on welfare. However, the other side of the coin is that higher maximum DE would allow those who would have worked anyway to receive higher welfare benefits, make more people eligible for welfare, encourage more people to enter the net, and keep people on welfare longer, thus increasing the welfare caseload and spending.
- (ii) At the end of March 2006, only 14 114 or 52% of the employable recipient in paid employment earned a monthly income which is sufficient to allow them to enjoy the maximum level of monthly DE. We have no evidence that there is an unmet demand for higher rates of DE.
- (iii) The current benefit levels for larger households are already appreciably higher than market wages for low-skilled jobs. A higher level of monthly DE will further push the total resources of CSSA families with an employed member further above market wages.
- (iv) The experience of the recent visit of some SWAC members to the US and Canada tells that there is no clear study result showing that DE creates incentives for work.

14. In this light, we do not propose any increase in the level of the maximum amount of DE.

(d) <u>Maintain no time limit on DE</u>

15. There has been suggestion to provide CSSA recipients a more generous monthly DE with a time limit whereby the maximum level of monthly DE will decline over time and be phased out after a certain period. We do not consider it desirable to set a time limit on DE. Our considerations are as follows :

- (i) Those who reach the time limit would have no incentive to continue working as they would lose a dollar of benefit for every dollar they earn. It is likely that many of the low-income recipients would choose to cease working altogether to avoid being "penalized" when they are no longer eligible for DE. It is the case that there are some working poor who genuinely cannot achieve self-sufficiency through no fault of their own.
- (ii) Operationally, the proposal would be complex to administer and difficult for the recipients to understand, given the large number of recipients and the fact that many recipients cycle on and off welfare. It would require development of a computer system to count individual CSSA recipients' months of receipt of DE and calculate their DE entitlement based on their earnings and their "DE clock" status.

Consultation with SWAC

16. We briefed SWAC on the proposal in para. 2 above on 1 December 2006. Members had no objection to the proposal.

(B) <u>"WELFARE TO SELF-RELIANCE"</u>

17. With a view to promoting "welfare to self-reliance", SWAC has looked into the social assistance programs in Australia, New Zealand, United States and Canada. A gist of how these places organize their respective welfare to self-reliance programs is set out at <u>Annex</u>.

18. After studying the overseas experience, SWAC members have the following preliminary views on how to promote "welfare to self-reliance" in Hong Kong :

- for the able-bodied unemployed, the best way to lift them from the (a) CSSA net is to assist them in seeking employment. The overseas experience of providing public assistance, employment support and re-training services under one roof or by one co-ordinating body provides useful reference. It is worth considering the possibility of developing an integrated approach or a one-stop service for helping CSSA able-bodied recipients seek employment, to including training/retraining, counselling, job search, job development, work trial opportunities and post-employment support etc.; and
- (b) the idea of introducing a time-limit on the receipt of CSSA payment is a more complicated issue given the "one-household rule" under the scheme and the need to provide subsistence support to those households reaching the time limit, especially the elderly and the children members. Factors like how to limit the requirement and how to manage the impact have to be carefully considered.

19. SWAC has established two ad hoc working groups to follow up on the issues above. Members' comments on the preliminary views of SWAC are welcome.

Health, Welfare and Food Bureau Social Welfare Department December 2006

SWAC Study : Summary Table on Key Features of Social Security Systems

A. <u>Disregarded Earnings (D.E.)</u>

Disregarded	Australia	New Zealand	The U.S.	Canada
Earnings				
Arrangements	For single recipients,	The net payment is	New York City: first US\$90 of monthly	<u>British Columbia:</u>
	after an initial "free	reduced by 70% of	earnings is disregarded; then 47% of	Earnings disregard has
	area" of AUD 62 per	gross earnings for	the remaining monthly earnings (in	been abolished since the
	fortnight, 50% of	income exceeding	excess of US\$90) is disregarded.	welfare reform in 2002
	income up to AUD 142	NZD 80 per week.		that imposed a time limit
	is withdrawn; a			on welfare payment to
	withdrawal rate of 70%			employable persons.
	thereafter.			
	For partnered recipients,			
	each receives an			
	allowance. If the higher			
	earning partner loses all			
	entitlement to benefit,			
	the spouse's allowance is			
	reduced of each dollar			
	his/her partner earns in			
	excess of the amount.			

B. <u>Welfare to Work/Employment Assistance Programmes</u>

Welfare to Work	Australia	New Zealand	The U.S.	Canada
Requirements for	Client must be doing	Recipients have to enter	Under the Temporary Assistance for	Ministry of Employment
Participation in	part-time paid work at	a Job Seeker	Needy Families (TANF) program,	and Income Assistance in
Work or	least 130 hours over 13	Agreement where they	recipients must work as soon as job is	British Columbia diverts
Community	fortnights.	agree to look for work or	ready, or no later than two years	potential clients through
Activities		prepare for work. A	after coming on assistance.	work search and a test of
	Client must participate	client's partner may be		financial independence
	in Community Work -	included in the benefit	Minimum participation rate of	prior to receiving
	(150-240 hours in six	and may also be asked to	employment activities/training for	assistance. Recipients
	months).	enter a Job Seeker	two-parent families increased to 90%	have to have 60-180 days
		Agreement.	in 1999.	of job search before
	Each applicant has to go			receiving assistance.
	through the Job			
	Capability assessment.			Clients able to work
	Can then be referred to			should complete an
	an employment support			Employment Plan. Each
	service.			plan is unique, based on a
				client's strengths and
				abilities and outlines the
				necessary steps to move
				towards employment.
				Employment Programme
	Employment	Government Supportive	Employment Activities/Training	Service providers work
	Programmes	<u>Initiatives</u>	Single parents have to participate in	one-on-one with clients.
	Jobs Pathway	Enterprising	employment activities/training for at	

	3	1	1
Programme - maint	ain Communities - grants	least 30 hours per week and	
regular contact for a	financial assistance to	two-parent families for at least 35	
least 6 months with	community organisations	hours per week since 2000. Failure	
individuals.	to design and implement	to participate in work requirements	
	community projects	can result in a reduction or	
	(including employment	termination of benefits to the family.	
	services)		
	Taskforce Green:		Service providers deliver a
Job Placement,	supports projects that	Activities counted towards	range of services such as
Employment and	benefit communities, and	l participation rate include	self-directed job searches,
Training - maintain	provides eligible job	employment, on the job training,	workshops on writing
regular contact for th	ne seekers with work skills	community services, job search and	resumes, job banks,
length of the program	n and experience.	education. But ceilings imposed: no	support for work related
(at least 6 months).		more than 23 months of vocational	expenses and short term
	Activity in the	training; no more than six weeks of	certificate training, life
Career Planning -	Community	job search etc.	skills and work experience.
involves two	programme - allows		
small-group sessions	. communities to		The Confirmed Job
	complete projects and		Programme assists clients
Voluntary work/	provides positive		to secure a confirmed job
training courses -	opportunity for people		by providing funds for
Centrelink has a larg	e looking for paid work.		essential items required to
national register of			begin work.
approved not-for-pro	ofit		
community organisa	tions		
for voluntary work.			

Roles of	Welfare programmes are	Both social security	Federal government provides states	Federal Government
Government and	overseen by Department	employment and	with block grants. Individual States	provides block grants to
Contractors	of Human Services but	assistance are	design and run their welfare	the Provinces to design
	administered through	administered by the	programmes, e.g. New York State's	and administer social
	Centrelink, which is a	Ministry of Social	welfare reform provides additional	welfare services. British
	government agency.	Development (Work	requirements for assistance and	Columbia was the first
		and Income Division).	creates the Safety Net programme.	province to impose a time
				limit in 2002.
	Agency/Contractor		<u>Contractors</u>	<u>Contractors</u>
	Centrelink works under a		The New York City Human Resource	Employment services are
	purchase /provider		Administration/ Department of	outsourced to three prime
	model with Government.		Social Services outsourced some of	contractors which work
	It provides one-stop		its employment assistance	with more than 80
	shop services.		programmes to non-profit making	community-based service
			organisations. The funding available is	providers.
	The Job Network is an		based on the job placements that the	
	Australia-wide network		organisations had achieved.	Contractors GT Hiring
	of organizations			and WCG International
	dedicated to helping			are private companies.
	people get and keep a			They provide customized
	job.			support life skills, training,
				case coordination,
				workshops, referrals to
				community service
				provider and job
				placement.